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A. Introduction
The corporate governance systems in Europe differ markedly. Economists tend to use stylized
models and distinguish between the Anglo-American, the German and the Latinist model.
1 In
this view, for instance, the Austrian, Dutch, German, and Swiss systems are said to be
variations of one model. For lawyers the picture is of course, much more detailed as particular
rules may vary even where common principles prevail. Many comparative studies on these
differences have been undertaken meanwhile.
2 I do not want to add another study but to treat a
different question. Are there as a consequence of growing internationalization, globalization of
markets and technological change, also tendencies of convergence of our corporate
governance systems?
My answer will be in two parts. As corporate governance systems are traditionally mainly
shaped by legislation, the first part will analyze the influence of the economic and technological
change on the rule-setting process itself.  How does this process react to the fundamental
environmental change? That includes a short analysis of the solution of centralized harmonizing
of company law within the EU as well as the question of whether EU-wide competition
between national corporate law legislators can be observed or be expected in the future. The
second part will then turn to the national level. It deals with actual tendencies of convergence
or, more correctly, of approach by the German corporate governance system to the Anglo-
American one.
B. The impact of internationalization and technological change on the rule-setting
process
I. Traditional rule-setting in corporate law
Until the nineteen seventies corporate laws in Europe and the rules relating to corporate
governance were the result of individual and separate national developments. Other than in the
U.S.,
3 there  was no competition between state legislators which would have forced them to
accelerate the production of new and more efficient rules. On the contrary, corporate law has
by and large been shaped individually and separately. Driving forces were the needs of each
economy at its particular stage of development. Each of these systems showed and still shows
specific features reflecting institutional differences, national political decision-making and3
cultural diversity.
4 As corporate law is a part of the rules relating to the organization of a
nation's production and its distribution, it is of course subject to political decisions as becomes
evident when we consider, for example,
5 the issue of employees' co-determination. Similarly,
there is a complex interplay between legal and ethical rules and the culture in which both are
embedded. For instance, in a nation where managers are accustomed to following generally
laws of all kinds, the legal system may do with fewer or relatively weaker explicit constraints
compared with other systems based on different cultural attitudes.
6
Of course, there has always been a mutual exchange of information and learning by
comparative studies and the like. Furthermore, company law systems on the Continent are
based on civil law with its common roots. Times of common political history
7 and the degree
of economic relationships are other factors which may also have contributed to the
development of similar rules. In principle though, corporate laws and corporate governance
systems were developed independently. Not only were the rule-setters different and
independent of each other but there was also little danger of emigration to more favourable
systems by those subject to the rules,
8 thereby sparking competition between national rule-
setters.
II. Harmonization within the EU
Things have changed however. The organs of the EU have the power to harmonize the
corporate laws of the member states as far as is necessary to achieve the aims of the Union.
The EU has issued several binding directives in this respect and initiated further proposals.
9
The majority of these rules relates to the relationship between the creditors and the trading or
investing public with the company rather than to  its internal governance structure.
10 The
Commission's (amended) "Proposal for a Fifth Directive concerning the structure of public
limited companies and the powers and obligations of their organs" has been thwarted by the
member states so far.
11 An earlier version of this draft proposal sought to impose on the other
EU member states a two-tier company board structure and a co-determination regime
resembling the Dutch and German systems. As that was deemed unacceptable by the other
members the Commission decided to open an option also for the one-tier system but still with
an obligatory participation of employees in the governance of the companies concerned.4
Equally, German and Dutch industry opposed strictly and successfully the implementation of a
takeover regulation resembling the British takeover code.
12
The legislative activities of the EU organs in corporate law, once seen as the only way to
provide for a "level playing field" for all companies within the EU and for equal protection for
their investors, creditors and consumers, have increasingly been rightly questioned.
13 Let me
mention only four criticisms here.
- First, the information costs savings for investors through harmonization are lost so far
as the member states may diverge from the standards set by the EU.
- Second, the rule-setting process at the EU level is cumbersome. Rules based on
compromises made by member states cannot be changed easily in the future when
necessary. EU made law tends to "petrify" which makes adaptation difficult.
- Third, the centralization of the rule-setting process hinders the development of
competing ideas and more efficient solutions at the various national levels.
- Fourth, the economic development within the EU is only part of the broader
development of increasing international competition and globalization of capital and
product markets. Big European companies that want to tap the American capital
market will have to comply with the investor protection rules there.
14 And the
international investor community - institutional investors like pension funds,
investment companies and so on - expects increasingly similar rules and treatment
wherever it is to invest its funds. Given this development and its pace, the question
has always to be whether harmonization or standardization of rules should, where
necessary, take place on the EU level or right away on a higher international level
instead.
15
Of course, that is not to say that any legislative activity of the EU in corporate or capital
market law is doubtful or detrimental. The exact line need not be drawn here. But far-reaching
standardization or harmonization of internal corporate governance structures "from above", on
the EU level, seems neither practically feasible nor theoretically convincing. This has also been
acknowledged officially through the implementation of the subsidiary principle in the EU
contract (Art. 3 b). Convergence of corporate governance systems in Europe as a consequence5
of harmonization activities of the EU should therefore not be expected in the foreseeable
future.
III. Competition between national legislators?
A view of the situation in the U.S. with its big developed capital market seems to confirm that
a corporate governance system shaped by numerous state legislators may well serve the needs
of firms, investors and the public. One position in the American federalism debate on the
production of corporate law even contends that this competition between various rule-setters
leads to a "race to the top" rather than for the bottom and to the production of more efficient,
better rules.
16 In this view, the goal of maximising revenues guides as an invisible hand the
decentralized system of state corporation laws to codify the arrangements that firms and
investors desire. State competition  for charters in the U.S. is said to have, in balance, benefited
shareholders.
If such competition between national legislators with similar wealth-increasing effects cannot
be observed yet in Europe, can it at least be expected in the future as international exchange
and capital flow increase? That is, in my opinion, doubtful for several reasons. Certainly,
competition between legislators does exist in Europe. The most recent example is the lowering
of corporate taxes on banks by the Luxembourg government as a reaction to more favourable
tax environments such as that in Ireland. Similarly, large German firms tended to hold Dutch
corporate finance subsidiaries rather than German ones precisely because of tax and other
regulatory considerations.
17 These regulatory constraints have as a result been repealed in part
by the Federal Parliament in order to make the financial location Germany more attractive.
18
However, competition between legislators for incorporations by favourable corporate
governance systems is much less likely to develop
19 for several reasons:
- In respect of existing companies, it is - unlike in the US - not possible simply to
choose reincorporation under the law of an other state. Except for Great Britain, the
Netherlands and Switzerland,
20 European nations follow the "real seat rule" rather
than the "statutory domicile rule". If a company wishes to be incorporated in an other
state it must take its effective seat there. That means moving the firm's headquarters6
and the relocation of human capital abroad which is, of course, costly. Furthermore,
the state in which the company was incorporated so far will treat the transfer of the
registered office as a liquidation which will very likely have negative tax consequences
(e.g., taxation of hidden reserves).
21
- As managements would have to ask shareholders for their consent to a change of the
company's seat, they could not simply choose an environment with a less shareholder-
oriented system (provided that management cannot influence shareholders' decisions
as it might do in a system that allows managers to vote as proxies).
- There is much less transnational cross-border mobility of managers, employees and
investors than in the  homogeneous language area of the U.S.
- As corporate governance rules are only part of a whole "package" that is offered to
firms - together with the rest of corporate law, labour law, tax law, social security and
other regulations -, a state with unfavourable and inefficient corporate governance
rules may still outrun the others if the rest of the package outweighs this
disadvantage.
The result of all this is that both now and in the foreseeable future European corporate
governance systems do not and probably will not converge as a consequence of centralized
rule-setting or of competition between national legislators. As the following will show,
convergence or, to be more precise, an approach at least by the German corporate governance
system to a more market-oriented, Anglo-American type model, can be observed. But this
process is, for the most part, a reaction of the traditional national rule-setting system, based on
infra-state discussion and lobbying by various political and interests groups - to
internationalization, the globalization of markets and technological change.7
C. Towards a market-oriented corporate governance system in Germany
I. Specific  features of the German corporate  governance system
If one compares the German with the Anglo-American corporate governance system, five main
particular features of the German system can be identified:
- the two-boards model;
- employee co-determination;
- concentration of shareholdings and a less developed stock market;
- dominance of banks and creditor- rather than shareholder-orientation;
- lack of public hostile takeover bids.
1. Two-tier structure
The two-tier structure as opposed to the widespread one board model means that in stock
corporations and large limited liability companies there is a management board which actually
runs the firm and a supervisory board with outside directors only. The supervisory board
appoints and dismisses the management and has the task of monitoring it.
22
2. Co-determination of employees
The presence of two separate boards is also relevant to the co-determination system. It
involves members of the supervisory board who are elected by the employees or appointed by
the trade unions. In firms with more than 500 employees, one third of the members of the
supervisory board is elected by the employees. In companies with more than 2,000 employees,
this number is increased to one half of the members of the supervisory board.
238
3. Concentration of shareholdings and stock market
Shareholdings are concentrated in German firms. Table  1 (cf. appendix) shows that for 85% of
171 industrial German quoted companies in 1990, there is at least one large shareholder
owning more than 25% of voting shares;
24 for a majority of these 171 companies there is a
majority shareholder. The table also shows that other German industrial companies account for
27% of dominant shareholdings, and families for a further 20%. German institutional investors,
including trusts and insurance companies, account for only 15%. Their rôle is hence a much
less important one compared with that played by institutional investors in the US and the UK.
Furthermore, the top companies in particular are linked to each other by capital and personal
interlocks.
25 The important rôle of financial institutions in this respect will be dealt with later.
The fact that there are comparatively few true "public companies" with widely dispersed
ownership corresponds with a small public stock market. In 1993, of the about 3,000 stock
corporations only 664 were listed.
26 In relation to our GNP market capitalization made up for
25% only whereas in Great Britain with 1,865 listed companies market capitalization was
132% of GNP.
27 The ancillary rôle played by the German stock exchanges until recently is
underlined by the fact that the market's organisation is still rather fragmented with its eight
stock exchanges and, until recently, market regulation was timid, supervision weak, and
enforcement rare.
4. The rôle of the banks and creditor-orientation
In the large publicly held companies especially, banks dominate the shareholders' meetings.
28 In
1992, for instance, banks cast on average more than 84% of all votes present at the meetings
of the 24 largest stock corporations with widely dispersed ownership.
29 This influence rests on
equity holdings, the votes cast by their subsidiary investment funds and, above all, their rôle as
proxies for their clients who have deposited their shares with them. This position enables them
to ensure their representatives' presence on supervisory boards.
30
Legal protection of outside shareholders appears to be less developed in the German than in
the common law systems.
31 The traditional strong creditor, rather than shareholder, orientation9
of German corporate law is manifest in various areas, especially as regards the availability of
information about the firm to shareholders and the investing public. There are for instance, no
quarterly reports to the stock exchange or the market supervisory authority; there is no
disclosure of other board memberships and no detailed disclosure of the salaries and bonuses
of the top management in the annual report of the firm. Additionally it is extremely difficult and
sometimes impossible for a minority shareholder in a stock corporation to obtain reliable
information about the firm outside the shareholders' meeting if he wants to sell his holding.
Furthermore, German insolvency law used always to be very favourable to creditors. Lastly,
the accounting rules are traditionally creditor and tax rather than shareholder oriented; this
factor will be dealt with later.
5. The lack of hostile public takeover bids
A further characteristic feature of the German corporate governance system is that there are
virtually no hostile public takeover bids and no "market for corporate control". However,
Julian Franks and Colin Mayer did find substantial evidence of sales of large stakes. Such
share stake sales are related to poor performance and therefore might point to a partial
substitute for the Anglo-American market for corporate control in firms with concentrated
ownership.
32
II. Determining factors of the present structure and pressures for change
a) What are the forces that formed this specific corporate governance model? As always, there
is a mixture of economic, political and cultural factors which has shaped the present system.
Decisions that have been taken and put through politically once and have led to further path-
dependent developments will not be overturned easily again as long as other, new forces are
not strong enough to bring about a change. The separation between a management and a
supervisory board dates back to the nineteenth century,
33 and the first co-determination law
was enacted in 1920.
34 Unlike the US and other nations, Germany did not react to the banking
crisis in the early thirties with an institutional separation between commercial banking and
industry. Political thought after the Second World War led to further co-determination laws,
and the economic success of German industry in that period did not suggest far-reaching10
reforms of corporate governance rules until recently. Let me add only two remarks on the issue
of creditor orientation and the absence of a "shareholder culture". First, German tax law
favours debt finance of firms more than equity finance.
35 Second, Figure 2 (appendix) shows
the portfolio stucture of private households in selected countries. German households invest
their funds only to a small extent in stock. Tax regulations channel retirement provisions
predominantly into other forms of investment. The main pillar of pension payments, the public
social security system, does not build up capital stock and invest on the capital market in any
event, and pension commitments of employers to their employees are financed mainly by
building up reserves within the company.
36 Hence pension money is invested only to a small
extent on the capital markets.
It will be understood that it is not intended here to contribute to the discussion about how this
particular corporate governance system and its special traits affects corporate performance,
and whether this or other systems are superior. As to the latter it seems necessary to take the
whole environment in which it has to prove successful into account, i.e. the stage of
development of the economy, technology, enforcement of law, political decisions and so on. In
any event, the characteristic balance of the German system created by these factors is now
under increasing pressure both from without and within. In the following I will first try to
describe this pressure for change. Then, in the final part, I will discuss what new temporary
equilibrium might emerge from this.
b) The pressure for change is the result of various developments. Let me identify four driving
factors first and then ask what their impact on our present system is or is likely to be.
- First, there is increasing pressure on German firms in product markets in which high
labour and social security costs put them at a competitive disadvantage. Lower
profitability increases domestic as well as transborder takeover activity. For managers
in firms with controlling shareholders that means increasing pressure and the threat of
dismissal.
37 Managements in widely held companies which are shielded from hostile
takeover activity are increasingly publicly criticized and have started to turn their
minds back to the core business of their firms and even to split up conglomerates.11
- Second, managements of large publicly held companies that wish to tap the
international capital markets must change their attitude regarding better investor
relations and more shareholder orientation, improving in particular information
provision and accounting policies, as well as implementing shareholder-value oriented
business techniques.
- Third, the development of an ageing population together with increasing
unemployment will render further major reforms of the pension system inevitable.
Private pension savings will be increasingly necessary and will channel funds, either
directly or through financial intermediaries into the national and international capital
markets, which may thus be further developed. That means that existing national
barriers to capital movement must be removed; there will be increased competition
between foreign and domestic performance oriented asset managers, and this will in
turn put pressure on managements in the portfolio companies to increase shareholder
orientation.
- The fourth factor leading to reform is the apparent failure of some supervisory boards
in recent cases to fulfil their rôles as monitors of management behaviour.
III. Actual developments
How will these factors influence our corporate governance system, what new equilibrium will
emerge from these developments? I cannot draw a complete picture here as the discussion is
still current, having only recently commenced. Furthermore, we will have to do with a moving
target rather than with a new static system as international competition grows, new
technologies and business and finance techniques develop, and as capital markets grow
together. The following remarks should be understood with these caveats.
The German corporate governance system will generally develop into a more shareholder
oriented system. That will only be a gradual process, be it by legislative action, or by change of
business attitudes and practices. Let me mention the main points of the current discussion and
the likely outcomes.12
1. Reform of the supervisory board
To start with, nobody questions the two-tier structure with separate managing and supervisory
boards. Nor is a choice between a two-tier system and a single board as in French corporate
law being considered. The main reason for this is the principle of co-determination by
employees, with representatives on the supervisory board, which will not be changed. On the
contrary, there seems to be a slight drift by the British one-board system towards the two-tier
model. The recommendations of the Cadbury Code for British companies have drawn a
noticeable line between outside and managing directors and distinguish between the chairman
of the board and the CEO
38 although this is certainly not thought as advocating the
introduction of a two-tier system there.
The reforms that are planned by the German government and parliament have more modest
aims: Information provision to the supervisory board shall be improved, conflicts of interests
shall be removed, professionalization of the supervisory board's work shall be fostered and, last
but not least, the board's liability, which was virtually non-existant so far shall be increased.
The reform bill will probably be enacted during the current legislative period. It will not
however, end the discussion of the rôle and the performance of supervisory boards. Important
questions have yet to be dealt with such as, for instance, the duties of a supervisory board
regarding a firm's derivative business.
39 Another open question is whether it is possible to
measure the performance of the incumbent management and impose duties on the supervisory
board to react to bad performance. There will be further discussion and development in this
area.
Regarding the co-determination system. No politician will dare to infringe on it as employees
and trade unions consider it as one of their "social assets" ("sozialer Besitzstand.")
Managements have also accommodated to the system, sometimes perhaps even gratefully, as it
contributes to shield companies from hostile takeovers and makes monitoring by the
supervisory board more difficult. The economic arguments for and against co-determination
have been discussed frequently.
40 What are now needed are more empirical and econometric13
studies on the correlation between co-determination and company performance.
41 That could
give rise to second thoughts in the future.
2. Proxy voting by banks
As previously mentioned, banks dominate the shareholders' meetings of companies with widely
distributed ownership. This influence rests on their own equity holdings, the votes cast by their
subsidiary investment funds and, above all, their rôle as proxies for those clients who have
deposited shares with them. This position, which enables them to appoint their representatives
to supervisory boards, has been discussed and criticized for decades, for both political, because
of the considerable economic and political power they wield,
42 as well as economic reasons. As
to the latter one should however, differentiate between the various sources of influence as they
pose different problems.
43 Recent econometric studies show that equity  holdings of banks and
the banks' rôles as proxies have opposite impacts on firms' performance.
44 However, the
governing conservative coalition does not intend to curb banks' influence on firms in following
the far-reaching proposals of the opposing Social Democrats.
45 Equity holdings of banks will
not be touched; their links with investment funds not be cut; and there will be only minimal, if
any, attempts to improve proxy voting by banks. Market forces may bring about more changes
in the future as the rôle of foreign and domestic bank-independent institutional investors
becomes more important.
3. Accounting rules
When Daimler-Benz had its shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange in October 1993, it
had to file a statement of accounts with the SEC and accept the obligation to set out the
group's annual accounts according to the US-GAAP in future. The interim report of Daimler
Benz of mid-1993 that was set out according to German accounting rules showed a surplus of
DM 168 mil. whereas the report following the GAAP-rules showed a loss of DM 949 mil.
46
This example illustrates the enormous differences in accounting practice and principles
between American and traditional Continental European accounting.
47 Accounting in Germany
is essentially affected by tax accounting rules and tax law because similar rules are used to
calculate both a company's taxable income and the income it reports in its public financial14
statements. It is not the overriding objective of accounting and annual statements of accounts
to provide a true and fair view for investors. Accounting rules are rather creditor-protective in
that they follow the principle of "precaution" or of "conservatism" which means for instance,
that foreseeable risks and losses will be allowed for immediately whereas profits will be
disregarded until they are realized.
48 Hence huge hidden reserves may be built up which in turn
may allow management to smooth out future losses. Case studies have shown the enormous
discretion which current German accounting rules leave for management.
49
Daimler-Benz was the first German company to accept the SEC's accounting demands
according to the US-GAAP in order to have its shares listed on the New York Stock
Exchange. Some large firms have decided to follow suit, whereas others such as Deutsche
Bank, prefer the rules of the IASC. The German Federal Government is considering whether
multinational firms with their seat in Germany should be allowed to set out their accounts and
annual reports on the group according to internationally accepted accounting principles.
4. Takeover Code
One efficiency explanation of takeovers is that they reduce agency costs. They constitute the
"market for corporate control" which is currently virtually absent in Germany, so far hostile
public takeovers are concerned. There are several structural as well as statutory takeover
impediments in place which make hostile takeovers of widely held companies very difficult if
not impossible.
50 The EU Commission has tried unsuccessfully, by various draft proposals, to
regulate a European public takeover market.
51 For Germany the proposed rules were to a great
extent redundant because of the lack of public takeovers. The Commission did not attempt to
remove the statutory or structural hurdles to hostile public takeovers. The main reason for the
German industry's strict opposition to the EU plans was the proposed mandatory bid for all
outstanding shares in a company as soon as a controlling interest has been acquired. Since the
adoption of the subsidiary principle, the Commission has changed its mind and has submitted a
slimmed down draft proposal.
52 This new draft proposal essentially leaves it to the member
states to decide in what way they provide protection for minority shareholders in the case of a
change of control. An expert commission appointed by the German Ministry of Finance has
anticipated this and developed a takeover code which shall be implemented by "voluntary"15
acknowledgement by the business community concerned. This voluntary code however,
cannot be considered to be genuinely investor-protective.
53 As only about one third of publicly
quoted companies have so far acknowledged this code, and as the opposing Social Democrats
tabled a bill last year providing for a much stricter statutory regulation,
54 it is not yet clear how
the future will be. It is however, clear that neither the opposition's proposal, nor the voluntary
code submitted by the expert commission will remove the barriers to hostile takeovers of
publicly held corporations.
Although there is certainly a development in the German corporate governance system towards
more investor-orientation, its pace is slow.16
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Table 1: Ordinary share stakes in excess of 25%, 50% and 75 % for the largest
171 German industrial quoted companies in 1990
   >25%   >50%   >75%
A. Companies with a widespread shareholding
1  14.6%  42.7%  77.8%
B.  Companies with a large shareholder
      the largest shareholder being ...
 85.4%  57.3%  22.2%
      1.  Another German company  27.5%  21.1%    9.9%
      2.  An insurance company    1.8%    0.0%    9.9%
      3.  A trust/an institutional investor  12.9%    6.4%    1.8%
      4.  A family group  20.5%  16.4%    5.3%
      5.  A foreign company
2    9.9%    8.8%    5.3%
      6.  A bank    5.8%    0.0%    0.0%
      7.  The German State    1.2%    1.2%    0.0%
      8.  Other German authorities    3.5%    2.9%    0.0%
      9.  A foreign state    0.0%    0.0%    0.0%
    10.  Unknown    2.3%    0.6%    0.0%
Total
3 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes:  
1  Acompany is widely held, if it has no shareholder holding of at least 25% of its
               voting capital.
 
2  Including foreign holding companies.
            
3  Discrepancies in the total may to due to rounding errors.
Source:   Franks/Mayer, The Ownership and Control of German Corporations.
               LSE and Oxford University Working Paper (1994)2223
Figure 1
Corporate Governance Structure of Siemens Aktiengesellschaft
Management Board
("Vorstand")
[17 members in 1990]
Appoints and
dismisses
Supervisory Board
("Aufsichtsrat")
[20 members]
               Elects half of the members                 Elects seven members
Appoints three members
       Shareholders Meeting                               Employees of Siemens
Labour
      ("Hauptversammlung")                              Aktiengesellschaft and
unions
     [~ 583,000 shareholders                                 "dependent" firms24
     Table 2: Domestic Listed Companies by Country and
                          Their Total Market Value at End of 1993
Country Capitalisation Domestic
Listed
in Ecu mn  % of GDP Companies
B       69,526    38.6      165
DK       35,504    30.6      206
D     409,610    25.1      664
GR       10,738    17.1      130
F     404,926    37.9      726
IRL       15,259    38.9        53
I     128,056    15.1      242
L       17,170  195.1        56
NL     162,356    61.5      239
P       10,432    16.3        89
ESP     105,675    25.9      374
UK  1,065,515  132.4   1,927
EU12  2,434,766    44.3   4,871
AUS       25,178    16.3      111
SF       20,922    29.7        57
SWE       95,095    59.7      197
EU15  2,575,961    43.8   5,236
CH     240,812  113.9      215
N       24,332    27.8      120
JAPAN  2,672,638    73.8   1,667
US-NYSE  3,752,446    70.3   1,788
US-NASDAQ     703,827    13.2   4,310
Note: Listed companies include main and parallel markets; listes companies and market capitalisation do
not include investment trusts, listed unit trusts and UCITS; the data refer to the main market of the
states mentioned, except for Germany, where it covers the federation of German exchanges.25
Source: FIBV, Federation of European Stock Exchanges, and European Economy.
Table 3:   Voting rights
a of banks in shareholders meetings of the 24 largest stock
corporations with widely dispersed ownership in 1992
No. firm presence
(%)
own
holdings
subsidiary
investm.
funds
proxies all
  1 Siemens 52,66   9,87 85,61 95,48
  2 Volkswagen 38,27   8,89 35,16 44,05
  3 Hoechst 71,39 10,74 87,72 98,46
  4 BASF 50,39   0,09 13,61 81,01 94,71
  5 Bayer 50,21 11,23 80,09 91,32
  6 Thyssen 67,66   6,77   3,62 34,98 45,37
  7 VEBA 53,40 12,62 78,23 90,85
  8 Mannesmann 37,20   7,76 90,35 98,11
  9 Deutsche Bank 46,79 12,41 82,32 94,73
10 MAN 72,09   8,67 12,69 26,84 48,20
11 Dresdner Bank 74,59   7,72 83,54 91,26
12 Preussag 69,00 40,65   4,51 54,30 99,46
13 Commerzbank 48,23 15,84 81,71 97,55
14 VIAG 69,68 10,92   7,43 30,75 49,10
15 Bayr. Vereinsbank 55,95 11,54 73,15 84,69
16 Degussa 73,26 13,65   8,65 38,35 60,55
17 AGIV 69,96 61,19 15,80 22,10 99,09
18 Bayr. Hypo 68,87   0,05 10,69 81,38 92,12
19 Linde 60,03 33,29 14,68 51,10 99,07
20 Deutsche Babcock 37,30   3,22 11,27 76,09 90,58
21 Schering 37,42 19,71 74,79 94,50
22 KHD 69,60 59,56   3,37 35,03 97,96
23 Bremer Vulkan 52,09   4,43 57,10 61,53
24 Strabag 67,10 74,45   3,62 21,21 99,28
average 58,05 13,02 10,11 60,95 84,09
a In % of the votes present; includes voting rights of bank-controlled investment funds.
Source:  Baums/Fraune Die Aktiengesellschaft 1995, 97 (102 f.).26
Table 4: Personal direct interlocks between firms and banks
               (both out of the group of the 100 largest enterprises)
Rank Year Bank (B)
Number of the firms
into whose
supervisory
board B sent its
managers
which sent their
managers into the
supervisory
board of B
14 1990 Deutsche Bank 35 2
20 1990 Dresdner Bank 19 1
23 1990 Commerzbank 16 4
36 1990 Bayerische Vereinsbank  3 2
52 1990 Bayerische Hypotheken- und
Wechselbank
 2 4
73 1990 Westdeutsche Landesbank  5 1
93 1990 DG Bank - Deutsche
Genossenschaftsbank
 5 0
Source: Neuntes Hauptgutachten der Monopolkommission,
Bundestags-Drucksache 12/3031, at p. 228-232.